

Packet Chasing:

Spying on Network Packets over a Cache Side-Channel

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University of California San Diego, University of Virginia

Performance Optimizations, Potential Security Threats

The New York Times

Researchers Discover Two Major Flaws in the World's Computers

Forbes

BillionairesInnovationLeadershipMoneyBusinessSmall Business

Intel Confirms ‘ZombieLoad 2’ Security Threat

ZDNet

MENU

US

New hardware-agnostic side-channel attack works against Windows and Linux

Side-channel attack almost certainly works against macOS, but researchers haven't tested it.

f

in

By Catalin Cimpanu for Zero Day | January 7, 2019 -- 18:52 GMT (10:52 PST) | Topic: Security

The Register®

Biting the hand that feeds IT

DATA CENTRE

SOFTWARE

SECURITY

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{* SECURITY *}

Spectre rises from the dead to bite Intel in the return stack buffer

Panic not: Invincible ghost in the machine dispelled by latest mitigations, we're told


By Thomas Claburn in San Francisco 23 Jul 2018 at 20:30

36


SHARE

2

High-Speed Networks




Intel Data Directed I/O (DDIO)




Packet Chasing: Attack Overview


hotcrp.com



Packet Chasing



Packet Chasing: Attack Overview




CVE-2019-11184 was assigned to track this issue.

Similar vulnerability is also discovered by NetCat, a concurrent work, that exploits DDIO to reveal keystroke

Packet Chasing: Overview of Defenses




Adaptive Partitioning




Ring Buffer Randomization

Intel DDIO Details



Intel DDIO Details

Intel Xeon E5-2660




Experimental Setup


- Intel's Gigabit Ethernet (IGB) driver version 5.3
- Intel I350 network adapter
- Intel Xeon E5-2660 with 20 MB last level cache with 16k cache sets
- Mastik Micro-Architectural Side-Channel Toolkit

Probing All the Cache


Intel Xeon E5-2660



Ring Buffer Allocation




Cache Footprint of Ring Buffer




White dot = detected activity on a set

Sets to Monitor




Detecting Packet Size


Probing First Block of
Page-Aligned Buffers




Probing Second Block of
Page-Aligned Buffers



Probing Third Block of
Page-Aligned Buffers



Probing Fourth Block of
Page-Aligned Buffers



Cache Set#
2-Block Packets

Detected Activity on Block 0 and 1

No Activity on Block 2 and 3




} 2 Cache Blocks

Detecting Packet Size

Probing First Block of
Page-Aligned Buffers






Block 0
Sample#



Probing Second Block of
Page-Aligned Buffers





Block 1
Sample#



Probing Third Block of
Page-Aligned Buffers






Block 2
Sample#




Probing Fourth Block of
Page-Aligned Buffers




Block 3
Sample#




Cache Set#
2-Block Packets



Cache Set#
3-Block Packets




Cache Set#
4-Block Packets



} 4 Cache Blocks

Detecting Packet Size



How many sets do we need to probe?

No knowledge about packet buffer locations

Need to probe 16,384 sets



Know all packet buffers are page aligned

Need to probe 256 sets



Know addresses and sequence order of all buffers


Need to probe 1 set




Chasing Packet over Cache



↓ If we know the order




Finding the Order of Buffers




Finding the Order of Buffers

Location of the
Buffers in rx Ring




► Packet Chasing can Recover the Order of Buffers with ~90% Accuracy


Receiving Packets without Network Access




Receiving Packets without Network Access



Encoding Covert Messages into Packet Size




Exploiting Packet Chasing for Web Fingerprinting




*This is just an example website and the attack is not limited to hotcrp

Website Fingerprinting Attack





Successful Login





Unsuccessful Login

Website Fingerprinting Attack

Packet Sizes



Recovered by Packet Chasing



Successful Login

Unsuccessful Login

Disabling DDIO as a Mitigation?


That's scary, can I just disable DDIO?




Yes, you can. You will have low packet processing speed, and you are still vulnerable.




Disabling DDIO as a Mitigation?



Packet Chasing: Overview of Defenses



Adaptive Partitioning




Ring Buffer Randomization



Adaptive Partitioning




Intel Xeon E5-2660



Ring Buffer Randomization



Performance Results



Conclusion

▶ Packet Chasing is an attack on the network that doesn't need access to the network

▶ High resolution covert and side channel attacks on the network I/O traffic

▶ While possible without DDIO, attacks are considerably more effective in the presence of DDIO

▶ Adaptive Partitioning is proposed as a low-overhead hardware mitigation

▶ Ring Buffer Randomization is proposed as a software-based short-term mitigation